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The End of Action: An 





Arendt’s concept of action, which she distinguishes from other human activities 
as the eminently political activity, is often regarded as a renewal of Aristotle’s 
concept of praxis. Arendt’s own remarks easily lead us to think that she is simply 
“rehabilitating” action from its Aristotelian subordination to contemplation. I will 
argue that in interpreting contemplation in its pure self-referentiality as the supreme 
kind of praxis, Aristotle is, in fact, realigning the pre-philosophical notion of action 
itself along the lines of the teleological means-end structure of production (poiēsis). 
Consequently, Arendt’s critique of philosophy’s traditional “forgetfulness” of action, 
which she sees as ultimately culminating in the totalitarian substitution of social 
production for political action, can be understood as a critique of the Aristotelian 
notion of praxis as such, along with its presuppositions. The roots of this critique 
can be traced back to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. 
1 I would like to thank the editors and Dana R. Villa for their valuable comments on this paper, as 
well as Julia Honkasalo, Krista Johansson, Mika Ojakangas, and other organizers for the opportunity 
to present an earlier version of it at the anniversary symposium Practice, Thought, and Judgment: 
Hannah Arendt 100 years (Helsinki, November 2006). Among other studies closely related to the topic 
of this paper, I would like to mention Jussi Backman, “Für das Wohnen denken: Heidegger, Arendt 
und die praktische Besinnung.” In Alfred Denker, Günter Figal, Franco Volpi & Holger Zaborowski 
(eds.), Heidegger-Jahrbuch, vol. 3: Heidegger und Aristoteles. Freiburg: Alber, 2007, 199–220; Peg 
Birmingham, “The Subject of Praxis.” Research in Phenomenology 29 (1999), 215–225; Jacques 
Taminiaux, “Bios politikos and bios theoretikos in the Phenomenology of Hannah Arendt.” Trans. 
Dermot Moran. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4(1996), 215–232; Jacques Taminiaux, 
The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker: Arendt and Heidegger. Trans. Michael Gendre. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997; Dana R. Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, 
Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action.” Political Theory 20 (1992), 274–308; and 
Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1996 (in particular 17–79).
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One of the key distinctions underlying the political thought of Hannah Arendt 
is the ancient Greek distinction between praxis, “doing, carrying out, (en)acting,” 
and poiēsis, “making, producing.” The distinction between action and productive 
work – both of them further distinguished from labor in the sense of mere toil, 
which has no purpose beyond the immediate satisfaction of life’s requirements – 
is meticulously elaborated by Arendt in The Human Condition (1958). This study 
constitutes, in effect, a genealogy of the modern human condition through a study 
of the shifting hierarchical positions of these three principal human activities in the 
history of Western thought. Even though Arendt’s approach is here much more 
general and “theoretical,” The Human Condition is still implicitly informed by the 
quest undertaken by Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951): to understand 
the terrifying totalitarian experiments of the 20th century, Stalinism and Nazism, with 
their unprecedented attempts at a total annihilation of political freedom and human 
spontaneity, not as contingent disasters but as essentially modern phenomena 
with firm roots in Western intellectual history and its ambiguous relationship to the 
domain of the political. The same quest persisted throughout Arendt’s later works: 
Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) is a “case study” in the totalitarian frame of mind, and 
the unfinished The Life of the Mind (1978) is an attempt at elaborating judging as the 
essentially political mental activity, traditionally overlooked by philosophy in favor of 
contemplative thinking – and increasingly, in modern times, in favor of willing.
In this essay, I will consider the role of Aristotle and his notion of praxis in this 
traditional “forgetfulness” of politics and political action as diagnosed by Arendt. 
I approach Aristotle from an Arendtian perspective and try to situate him in the 
context of Arendt’s historical accounts; however, I will also attempt to make a few 
critical additions to Arendt’s remarks on Aristotle’s practical philosophy. Aristotle did 
not simply subordinate action to contemplation, but rather defined contemplation 
(theōrein) as the supreme kind of action – as the activity that fulfills what Aristotle 
regards as the fundamental criteria of proper praxis, namely, self-referentiality and 
self-sufficiency. I further suggest that this Aristotelian realignment of praxis is rooted 
in the very tendency that Arendt points out as being fateful for political philosophy: 
thinking action in teleological terms, which ultimately amounts to thinking action in 
terms of production, i.e., as a means for attaining an end. 
It follows from this that the notion of action that Arendt operates with is not simply 
a “rehabilitation” of Aristotelian praxis, as has sometimes been suggested. Jürgen 
Habermas, for example, reads The Human Condition as a “systematic renewal 
[Erneuerung] of the Aristotelian concept of praxis” and sees the weaknesses in 
Arendt’s conceptuality as deriving “from the fact that Arendt remains bound to the 
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historical and conceptual constellation of Aristotelian thought.”2 Nor can Arendt’s 
relationship to Aristotle be understood as a simple reversal in an order of preference, 
as some of Arendt’s own remarks might lead us to think, with Aristotle preferring 
contemplation and Arendt preferring action. Rather, with Jacques Taminiaux and 
Dana R. Villa, I will argue that Arendt’s critique of the philosophical tradition entails 
a fundamental critique of the Aristotelian concept of praxis itself.3 
The Pre-Philosophical Experience of the 
Transience of praxis and the Political Solution
When, in the ancient Greek context, an activity was addressed as poiēsis, it was 
considered in terms of a separate and predetermined outcome or result that bestows 
an instrumental meaning on the activity itself. This, of course, applies first and 
foremost to productive craftsmanship, such as building a house.4 A praxis, however, 
is an activity considered in terms of what is enacted or performed during the action 
itself, and of the way in which this is done; its outcome, if any, is extraneous to 
the action itself.5 Since praxis, once it ceases, does not leave behind anything 
of itself qua praxis, it is vital that the agent be seen by others while she is acting. 
For example, the acts of the Greeks at the battle of Thermopylae were glorious 
praxeis, but only because the greatness of the acts themselves survived through 
the testimony of witnesses; the result of the battle was the defeat and slaughter of 
the Greeks. The acts of the Apostles (Praxeis apostolōn) were not great because 
of their accomplishments – many of them perished as martyrs – but because of the 
great faith and courage manifested in and through those deeds. 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “Hannah Arendts Begriff der Macht” [1976]. In Jürgen Habermas, Philosophisch-
politische Profile. 3rd ed. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984, 232. Trans. “Hannah Arendt: On 
the Concept of Power.” In Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles. Trans. Frederick G. 
Lawrence. London: Heinemann, 1983, 174. Translation modified.
3 Taminiaux (“Bios politikos and bios theoretikos in the Phenomenology of Hannah Arendt,” The 
Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker) has convincingly shown that Arendt rejects the Platonic-
Aristotelian subordination of bios politikos to bios theōrētikos. According to Taminiaux, even Heidegger 
ultimately upholds this hierarchy. With Birmingham (“The Subject of Praxis”), I consider this reading 
of Heidegger to be a simplification, yet valid to a certain extent. Villa (“Beyond Good and Evil,” 
Arendt and Heidegger), moreover, has argued that Arendt’s reading of Aristotle is by no means a 
mere renewal, but rather a critical reappropriation, heavily influenced by Heidegger’s reappropriating 
readings of Aristotle. I have discussed this issue more extensively in Backman, “Für das Wohnen 
denken.”
4 See Pierre Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: Histoire des mots. Paris: 
Klincksieck, 1999, 922–923. In Homer (see e.g. Iliad. In Homeri Ilias. Ed. Thomas W. Allen. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1931, I.608, VII.435), poieō is particularly used to refer to the activity of building.
5 See Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, 934–35; Günther Bien, Theo 
Kobusch & Heinz Kleger, “Praxis, praktisch.” In Joachim Ritter & Karlfried Gründer (eds.), Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 7. Basel: Schwabe, 1989, 1277–1307. In Homer (see e.g. Iliad 
XIV.282, Odyssey. In Homeri Odyssea. Ed. P. von der Mühll. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1962, 
VIII.259, XIX.323–24), prēssō means “to accomplish,” “to enact,” “to take care of,” in the concrete 
sense of “passing through” an action (in particular, a journey), with an emphasis on the action itself 
and not its result. 
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In this sense, as Arendt points out, human action is to be regarded as the 
self-disclosure of the agent. The quality of a person’s acts are what distinguish 
her individual life-span or life story, bios, from the mere fact of being alive, zōē, 
common to all living creatures. Through her deeds, a person’s relative individuality 
– who she is for other people – is constituted. This cannot be accomplished 
through the outcome or result of those deeds, no matter how great they are – 
you can never tell who somebody was from what she made (even though this is 
frequently attempted in, for example, biographies of artists). A praxis can survive 
the mortal agent only in the form of narratives, which, of course, are dependent on 
other mortals who narrate them.6 
According to Arendt, the experience of this transience of mortal humans and 
their affairs and deeds – of the “vanity of vanities” lamented by the Old Testament 
Ecclesiastes – as opposed to the permanence of the gods and the cosmic order 
and to the cyclic recurrence of nature, was fundamental for Greek politics. The 
great deeds of the archaic forefathers in the Trojan War were a cultural ideal 
acknowledged by all Greeks, but even those praxeis had survived only in the 
form of a poiēsis, namely, the poetic work attributed to Homer. In the cultural self-
understanding of the classical Greek period, the foundation of the polis – a word 
that did not mean simply “community,” “city,” or “state,” but rather an enclosed and 
sheltered, i.e., organized and constitutional communal space – was an attempt at 
resolving this predicament, at overcoming the mortality, finitude, and transience of 
human undertakings. A constitutional political space was to create a permanent 
public assembly in which the restricted elite of citizens, free of the necessities 
and constraints of simple survival and of relationships of domination or obedience 
belonging to the private sphere, would have maximal opportunities for gaining 
mutual recognition for their appropriate and excellent deeds and words – and for 
making this recognition last in the form of immortal fame. This possibility of granting 
permanence to praxis was considered to furnish human action with a new kind of 
meaningfulness. The polis was to make possible a life in which the endless natural 
cycle of birth, struggle for survival, procreation, and death would no longer be the 
6 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition [1958]. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 
7–8, 97, 175–192; Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 
[1961]. New York: Penguin, 1993, 151–156.
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only permanent feature; that is, a life with a lasting and truly human dignity, over 
and above the mere survival of the animal species.7 
Aristotle notes at the beginning of the Politics that whereas the primitive human 
community, the household (oikos), is a purely economic and private partnership that 
exists for the sake of survival in the face of necessity, the polis is the supreme human 
conglomeration that exists for the sake of the “good life” (eu zēn) – for the sake of the 
most appropriate way of being a human, i.e., in order to make possible a way of life 
in which human beings can carry out their specifically human capacities.8 Besides 
freeing its citizens from the need to cope with necessity and to survive, the polis 
also professed to free them from their dependency on poiēsis, i.e., on the production 
of permanent works of poetry or other monuments. In the famous Funeral Oration 
narrated by Thucydides, the great Athenian statesman Pericles declares that the 
Athenians, unlike their ancestors who fought in Troy, are no longer dependent on 
poets:
[…] far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist […] we have forced every sea and 
land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere we have established permanent 
reminders of our deeds, both worthless and excellent. […] For conspicuous [epiphanōn] 
men have the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the 
column with its epitaph records it, there dwells in everyone an unwritten record – the 
record of judgment [gnōmēs], rather than that of the produced work [ergou].9
The establishment of a political space of civic freedom and equality, with walls 
to protect it from enemies, with laws to protect it from the excesses of its own 
7 Arendt, The Human Condition, 19, 56, 173, 188–201, 220, 232; Between Past and Future, 41–
48, 71–75; The Life of the Mind, vol. 1: Thinking [1971]. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1981, 131–135. Arendt has, of course, been widely criticized for glorifying the elitist civic freedom 
and political equality of the ancient slave-owning communities, which were based on non-egalitarian 
social institutions (see e.g. Hauke Brunkhorst, “Equality and Elitism in Arendt.” In Dana R. Villa [ed.], 
The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 178–
198). However, this is a simplification. Her discussion of ancient politics is not a nostalgic revival, 
but rather a Heideggerian “retrieval” (Wiederholung) and reappropriation of ancient political ideals 
in the present post-totalitarian context – a “critique of the present” with the help of antiquity. (Cf. 
J. Peter Euben, “Arendt’s Hellenism.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 153–164) 
Moreover, as Taminiaux (“Athens and Rome.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 
165–177) has pointed out, in spite of her use of Pericles’ Athens as a model, Arendt was no uncritical 
“Graecomaniac”; the most fully “political” ancient community was for her not Athens but the Roman 
Republic. Roy T. Tsao (“Arendt against Athens: Rereading the Human Condition.” Political Theory 30 
[2002], 97–123) has argued that The Human Condition should, in fact, be read as addressing the 
political project and ideal of Pericles’ Athens as inherently flawed and doomed to failure, not as a 
model for present-day politics.
8 Aristotle, Politics/Politica. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon, 1957, I.1.1252a1–7, 2.1252b12–
14, 15–16, 27–30. As Arendt (The Human Condition, 37, 183 n. 8) notes, Aristotle’s notion of the polis 
differs from the archaic Greek conception in that Aristotle takes the polis, just like the inferior forms 
of community, to come to be naturally (physei), on the basis of the basic human striving for survival, 
and not through a free act of foundation, even though he adds that the polis persists in existence for 
the sake of the good life. 
9 Thucydides, Historiae, 2 vols. Ed. Henry S. Jones & John E. Powell. Oxford: Clarendon, 1955–
56, II.41.4, 43.3–4. Trans. The Peloponnesian War. Trans. Richard Crawley. London: J. M. Dent, 
1910. Translation modified. Cf. Arendt, The Human Condition, 197, 205–206; Between Past and 
Future, 72, 217; The Life of the Mind, vol. 1: Thinking, 133. 
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members, and with slaves and women to deal with the economical necessities of 
private life, thus allowed the memory of individual human deeds to become relatively 
permanent. It offered human beings the possibility of measuring up to the cosmic 
permanence of the world they live in – a hope of immortality for mortals. Yet, as Arendt 
points out, the words imputed to Pericles are overly optimistic about the possible 
permanence of praxis.10 Even in the form of organized politics, human relationships 
and human affairs remain a very intricate, fragile, and easily corruptible business. 
The Golden Age of Athens in the 5th century B.C. ended with Athens’ defeat in the 
Peloponnesian War; the Greek political freedom of the classical age ended with the 
death of Alexander the Great, which nearly coincides with the death of Aristotle. 
Between these two events, the new cultural form known as philosophy was instituted 
in Athens by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. With Nietzsche and Heidegger, Arendt 
sees the birth of Occidental philosophy in its Platonic, metaphysical form as the 
symptom of a decisive transformation within the Greek world itself.
The Philosophical Transformation of praxis: 
Aristotle and the End of Action
If we are to believe the story that the Presocratic Heraclitus valued playing dice with 
children above political involvement, philosophy – the study of the most general 
and fundamental structures of reality – had already in its earliest stages tended 
to withdraw from public life into the solitude of thinking.11 Yet it seems that the 
original intention of Socrates, the founder of the Athenian philosophical tradition, 
was precisely to introduce critical thinking into the public life of the polis. He was an 
eminently public figure. We know only too well how Socrates’ project was ultimately 
received by the political community. The public trial and execution of Socrates, 
the most “worthy, mindful, and just man”12 of his day, apparently left Plato – who 
in his youth had prepared for a political career – permanently disillusioned about 
the possibility of achieving the truly supreme human life within the political sphere. 
With Plato, philosophical thinking became the quest for an insight into the absolute, 
necessary, and eternal structures underlying the relative, contingent, and temporal 
everyday human reality. According to Arendt, Plato’s frustrating political experience 
was his encounter with the incompatibility of this quest for absolute truth with the 
10 Arendt, The Human Condition, 205. Cf. Tsao, “Arendt against Athens.” 
11 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum. In Diogenis Laertii Vitae philosophorum, 2 vols. Ed. H. 
S. Long. Oxford: Clarendon, 1964, IX.3.
12 Plato, Phaedo. In Plato, Platonis opera, Vol. 1: Tetralogias I–II continens. Ed. John Burnet. 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1899, 118a16–17.
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political realm of shifting opinions and persuasion.13 However, we must also note 
Arendt’s suggestion, in The Life of the Mind, that Socrates may have been aware 
of another way in which thinking could become politically relevant. In Arendt’s view, 
the first one to fully discover this faculty of transforming thinking into judgments and 
opinions was Kant in his Critique of Judgment, which, for Arendt, constitutes the 
true “political philosophy” of Kant.14
In the Republic, Plato toyed with the idea of replacing politics altogether with a 
government based on the tyranny not of philosophers but of the absolute and ideal 
truth that philosophy pursues. Whether this was meant in full earnest is hard to tell; 
in any case, Plato’s reported unfortunate experiences with educating the tyrant of 
Syracuse revealed that such a government was unfeasible for the time being. Plato’s 
late political work, Laws, is much less “utopian,” but here, as well, politics is articulated 
in terms of government and legislation, which for the earlier Greek mind were mere 
preconditions of political life.15 It is thus to Aristotle that we must turn in order to find a 
more mature formulation of the philosophical outlook on political life and on the way 
of life most appropriate for the human being – a formulation that in certain implicit 
respects became normative for the entire later tradition of political philosophy. This 
formulation is to be found in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s main work on the 
ends of human life, to which the Politics is a sequel and complement.
Aristotle, it seems, had no illusions about the political capacity of philosophers, 
being well aware that theoretical thinkers are not particularly well disposed for 
political action,16 and he never dreamt of denying the essential role of political life for 
the human being. The human being is, in her very being, a political creature (zōon 
politikon) – not just a gregarious animal, such as the bee. The human capacity for 
discourse (logos) makes the human community, the polis, unique in that it is based 
on the discursive sharing of meaning and of a meaningful reality.17 Humans, as we 
saw, need organized communal and public life not only in order to survive, but also in 
13 Arendt, The Human Condition, 20, 185; Between Past and Future, 17, 25, 68, 107–115, 227–264; 
“Martin Heidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt” [1969]. In Hannah Arendt & Martin Heidegger, Briefe 1925 
bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse. Ed. Ursula Ludz. 3rd ed. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2002, 
190–191; trans. “For Martin Heidegger’s Eightieth Birthday.” Trans. Lisa Harries. In Martin Heidegger 
and National Socialism: Questions and Answers. Ed. Günther Neske & Emil Kettering. New York: 
Paragon House, 1990, 215–217; The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: Thinking, 80–84. 
14 See Arendt, “Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding” [1954]. In Essays in 
Understanding 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, Totalitarianism. Ed. Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken 
Books, 1994, 313–314; Between Past and Future, 82–85, 219–224, 241–249; Lectures on Kant’s 
Political Philosophy [1970]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982; The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: 
Thinking, 94–96, 111, 129–130, 166–216. Cf. Roland Beiner, “Hannah Arendt on Judging.” In Hannah 
Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 89–156, 164–174.
15 On Plato’s political philosophy, see Arendt, The Human Condition, 220–230; Between Past and 
Future, 17–19, 104–115, 120, 129–131; Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 21, 59–60. 
16 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics/Ethica Nicomachea. Ed. I. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon, 1894, 
VI.5.1140b2–11, 7.1141a28–b8.
17 Aristotle, Politics I.2.1253a7–18.
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order to fulfill their highest capacities. In many ways, Aristotle’s ethics and politics are 
thus a conceptual articulation of the pre-philosophical Greek outlook on the matter.
Moreover, in his elaboration of the difference between poiēsis and praxis, 
Aristotle quite manifestly holds to the traditional primacy of praxis. Fully in keeping 
with the earlier tradition, Aristotle points out that “a course of life [bios] is action 
[praxis], not production [poiēsis],”18 meaning that a life-project as such is not 
an instrumental process aiming at some outcome beyond itself, but ultimately 
consists in a self-enactment that lasts only as long as life lasts. As we saw, this 
also implies that what decides the quality of an individual life is the way in which 
it is lived, not what is achieved in that life. Thus, the fundamental premise of the 
Nicomachean Ethics – that what constitutes excellence (agathon) in the sphere 
of conducting a human life is “prosperity,” eudaimonia – is not really a doctrine 
but a simple explication of the notion of excellent living.19 Eudaimonia does not 
mean an achieved state of subjective happiness or objective well-being, but is 
simply a name for the quality of the action constituting the good life. Accordingly, 
it is often expressed with a verb, eudaimonein. Equally self-explanatory is the 
contention that “living well” (eu zēn) is synonymous with “acting well” (eu prattein), 
for this simply means that the good life consists in living, in enacting a good life. 
However, as Aristotle himself emphasizes, the multitude of men disagree with 
men of insight (sophoi) as to what this most excellent enactment of living consists 
in. He is actually preparing us for his own answer, which will deviate decisively 
from the answer of the many – that is, from the traditional Greek view of the good 
life. This answer is, however, a direct consequence of his definition of praxis, to 
which we must therefore pay close attention.
We find the first inconclusive philosophical discussion of the praxis–poiēsis 
distinction in Plato’s Charmides.20 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle settles this 
issue with a seemingly simple definition: “The end [telos] of producing [poiēseōs] 
is other than the producing itself, but the end of acting [praxeōs], arguably, is 
not other; for appropriate action [eupraxia] is itself an end.”21 He claims that this 
distinction can be found in popular discourses (exōterikoi logoi),22 and at first sight 
this definition seems to agree perfectly with the pre-philosophical understanding 
of praxis referred to above. However, it does say somewhat more. While affirming 
18 Aristotle, Politics I.4.1254a7.
19 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.4.1095a14–22. Cf. Arendt, The Human Condition, 192–193; The 
Life of the Mind, Vol. 2: Willing [1974–75]. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981, 61, 74–
75.
20 Plato, Charmides. In Plato, Platonis opera, Vol. 3: Tetralogias V–VII continens. Ed. John Burnet. 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1903) 163a10–e11.
21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.5.1140b6–7. My translation.
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.4.1140a2–3.
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that praxis does not take place for the sake of an external end, Aristotle adds that 
praxis does have an end – namely, itself. In other words, what matters in both 
poiēsis and praxis is an end, which, in the case of pure praxis, simply coincides 
with the activity itself and therefore does not survive it. This is all the more evident 
from the passage of the Metaphysics in which Aristotle illustrates energeia, perfect 
activity or actuality, with the help of poiēsis and praxis:
None of the activities [praxeōn] for which there is a limit [peras] is an end [telos] [in 
itself], but these are rather activities that are concerned with the end [...], and, as that 
for the sake of which [hōn heneka] the movement takes place is not present [in the 
movement itself], they are not action [praxis], or, in any case, they are not complete 
action, since they are not an end [in themselves]. But the other kind [of activity – i.e., 
besides the unfinished activity, which is not true praxis – is truly praxis], insofar as 
the end and the activity itself are both present. For example, one has, while seeing 
[hora], <at once already attained seeing,> one has, while still thinking [phronei], 
<already attained thinking,> one has, while still apprehending [noei], already attained 
apprehension; whereas, while still learning [something], one has not already learned 
[it], and while still recovering, one has not already recovered. While living properly, one 
has at once [hama] already attained proper living, and while prospering [eudaimonei], 
one has already attained prosperity.23
In her reading of this passage in The Human Condition, Arendt insists that, for 
Aristotle, “[t]his specifically human achievement lies altogether outside the category 
of means and ends […] the means to achieve the end would already be the end 
[…].”24 However, as we see from the passage itself, this is not entirely accurate: 
an end is indeed attributed even to praxis. Arendt does not seem to have been 
fully aware of the extent of the Aristotelian transformation of the concept of praxis 
itself. When discussing praxis in Aristotle, she takes it to mean simply “action” in 
a general Greek sense, and (in my opinion wrongly) reads Aristotle as explicitly 
subordinating praxis to poiēsis as well as to theōria: 
[…] Aristotle […] places […] practical insight and political science at the lowest rank of his 
order, and puts above them the science of fabrication […] which immediately precedes 
and lead to theōria, the contemplation of truth. […] the reason for this predilection in 
philosophy is […] that contemplation and fabrication (theōria and poiēsis) have an 
inner affinity and do not stand in the same unequivocal opposition to each other as 
contemplation and action.25
23 Aristotle, Metaphysics. In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2 vols. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1924, θ.6.1048b18–19, 20–26. My translation. For unknown reasons, this passage is omitted in some 
Greek manuscripts and is obviously corrupt in others. Moreover, even though its general point is clear, 
many individual phrases are ambiguous. The passages given in <angle brackets> are emendations 
suggested by Hermann Bonitz. See W.D. Ross’s comment, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. 2, 253–254.
24 Arendt, The Human Condition, 205–206. Cf. The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2: Willing, 123–124: “In 
Aristotle it is quite clear that praxis […] cannot be understood in terms of the means-end category […].”
25 Arendt, The Human Condition, 301. Cf. The Human Condition, 12–14, 25; The Life of the Mind, 
Vol. 2: Willing, 123–124. However, Arendt’s formulation in the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 
21, comes close to the one I am pursuing here. 
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To be sure, Aristotle does apply a threefold division of human activities into 
production (poiēsis), action (praxis), and contemplation (theōria) in his classification 
of the sciences, to which Arendt is referring, and on several other occasions.26 
However, whereas Arendt’s reading contains certain profound insights into Aristotle’s 
concepts, her claim that praxis is now subordinated to poiēsis as well as to theōria 
is not supported by the passages to which she refers, except by the habitual order 
in which Aristotle lists the three domains of science (practical, productive, and 
theoretical). Aristotle does not regard action as inferior to production. It would be 
more correct to say that he regards action as a kind of perfected production in 
which the end is immanent in and identical with the process of its production.
The examples of praxis given by Aristotle – seeing (horan), thinking (phronein), 
apprehending (noein) – indicate that in spite of certain basic common features, this 
is not the concept of action that Arendt operates with, a concept modeled on what she 
takes to be the original, pre-philosophical Greek concept. What matters in Arendt’s 
concept of action is not the end, the telos at all, but rather the beginning, the archē, 
undertaking a new venture whose outcome or end cannot be foreseen. The only 
standard for such a new venture is courage, daring to embark on something new 
and unpredictable, and the consequent “greatness” of the undertaking.27 As Dana 
R.Villa puts it: “Arendt’s theory of political action should be read as the sustained 
attempt to think of praxis outside the teleological framework.”28 We know how fond 
Arendt is of quoting Augustine’s words, Initium ut esset creatus est homo, “man 
was created so that a beginning be,”29 i.e., in order that entirely new undertakings 
and ventures could come about in the historical human world. 
Aristotle, on the contrary, considers both producing and acting in terms of means 
and ends; the only standard of action is the coincidence of the means with the 
end, i.e., the self-referentiality and self-sufficiency of the action. Aristotle’s action 
therefore requires no courage at all – on the contrary, its outcome is even more 
certain than that of production, in which it is at least possible to fail. The supreme 
26 This division is first and foremost used by Aristotle in his classification of science (epistēmē) 
into theoretical, practical, and productive sciences is to be found in Metaphysics Ε.1.1025b18–28 
and in Κ.7.1064a10–19. Theoretical, contemplative, or speculative science (first philosophy or 
theology, mathematics, and physics) studies the permanent and necessary structures of reality as 
it is; practical or action-related science (ethics, politics) studies the active human life in its singular 
situations as well as the enactment of the supreme kind of action, both on the individual and on the 
communal level; and productive science or art (rhetoric, poetics) studies the means for achieving 
specific results. Cf. Aristotle, Topics (Topica et Sophistici elenchi. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1958) VI.6.145a15–18; Nicomachean Ethics VI.2.1139a26–31. We also find praxis distinguished 
from theōria in Nicomachean Ethics X.8.1178b20–21; cf. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2: Willing, 
124.
27 Arendt, The Human Condition, 7–8, 144, 176–192, 205–206, 222–225, 230–237, 243–247; 
Between Past and Future, 59–63, 151–154, 169–171. 
28 Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, 47.
29 Augustine, De civitate Dei. In J.-P. Migne (ed.), Patrologia Latina, Vol. 41. Paris: Migne, 1845, 13–
804, XII.20.4. See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [1951]. New ed. San Diego, CA: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1973, 479; The Human Condition, 177; Between Past and Future, 167; The Life 
of the Mind, Vol. 2: Willing, 18, 108–110, 158, 217. 
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and purest praxis thus becomes the least risky and the most predictable activity of 
all: the end is attained as soon as the activity is undertaken. There is no chance 
that anything new could ever come out of it. It is clear that this ultimately divests 
action of political significance. Like production, action is an individual project that 
can be undertaken in solitude, as it no longer requires being seen, acknowledged, 
or supported by others. Aristotle states this explicitly, aware that he is running 
against the popular understanding of action:
[…] the life of action [bios praktikos] is, arguably, the best way of life both communally for 
the entire polis as well as for each individual. But the life of action is not necessarily lived 
in relation to others, as some believe, nor are action-related considerations [dianoias] 
limited to those that aim at the results that come out of acting; rather, the contemplations 
[theōrias] and considerations that are self-referential [autoteleis] and take place for their 
own sake are much more action-related. For proper action [eupraxia] is an end, and 
thus the end is a kind of action.30
Contemplation as Self-Sufficient and Immortal 
Action: The temporalities of praxis
The question concerning the best way of life, conceived of as the most authentic 
kind of praxis, has thereby implicitly been answered. At the beginning of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle introduces, as possible candidates for the good life, 
three alternative ways of life that can be freely chosen for their own sake (excluding, 
of course, the life of the laboring slave and the life of the working craftsman, which 
no one freely chooses, as they are both dictated by force or economic necessity): 
(1) the life of bodily enjoyment (bios apolaustikos); (2) the political life of public 
action (bios politikos); and (3) the life of contemplation (bios theōrētikos).31 The first 
alternative is dismissed immediately, as Aristotle agrees with his tradition that mere 
bodily pleasure does not fulfill the capacities specific to the human being. Most of 
the Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to discussing the political life and its respective 
excellences, as this is the best kind of life for the multitude of free men. However, 
keeping in mind the principle of self-sufficiency, as well as the theoretical character 
of the examples of praxis that Aristotle gives in the Metaphysics (seeing, thinking, 
apprehending), the conclusion in Book 10 in favor of the life of contemplation is 
more or less inevitable. 
To be sure, living a political life does enable the human being to prosper, since 
this life is precisely an enactment of the ethical excellences, i.e., of the properly 
30 Aristotle, Politics VII.3.1325b15–21. My translation. Cf. Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy, 21; Martin Heidegger, Einleitung in die Philosophie [1928–29]. Ed. Otto Saame & Ina 
Saame-Speidel. 2nd ed. Gesamtausgabe 27. Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 2001, 167–179.
31 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.5.1095b14–1096a10. Cf. Arendt, The Human Condition, 12–13; 
The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: Thinking, 20. 
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human capacities of the human being.32 Yet the essential shortcoming of political 
life is evident: it lacks complete self-sufficiency, autarky (autarkeia). The public 
agent who enacts justice still needs fellow humans, since no one can be just by 
herself. The only perfectly self-sufficient, self-motivated, and self-referential activity 
that the human being is capable of is philosophical contemplation (theōrein), i.e., 
the disinterested, pure, and comprehensive beholding of the archai, of the eternal, 
necessary, and unchanging principles and fundamental structures of all meaningful 
reality. This contemplation enacts the virtue of wisdom or comprehensive 
understanding (sophia). Yet Aristotle recognizes that such a solitary and self-
sufficient activity, withdrawn from human affairs and human relationships, is no 
longer really human but divine. Paradoxically, the activity in which the supreme 
human praxis consists and which thus enacts the human being’s humanity in the 
most complete and authentic manner possible, is actually a superhuman activity, 
for it likens the human being to God and allows her to “immortalize” (athanatizein), 
that is, to dwell with eternal and supratemporal truths, thereby elevating the 
contemplator herself beyond time and mortality.
This self-sufficiency [autarkeia] that we mentioned is most complete in the context of 
contemplative [theōrētikēn] activity. For the wise man [sophos], the just man [dikaios], 
and all others alike require what is necessary for survival, and when this has been 
adequately provided for, the just man will additionally require other people towards 
whom and with whom he may act justly, and the same is true for the moderate man 
[sōphrōn], the manly man [andreios], and all others. The wise man, however, is capable 
of contemplating [theōrein] even when he is by himself [kath’ hauton], and his capacity 
to do this is proportional to his wisdom. Perhaps he will be more successful if he has 
associates [synergoi], but all the same, he is the most self-sufficient of all [autarkestatos]. 
[…] Yet such a way of life is, arguably, superior to the essentially human [kat’ anthrōpon] 
way of life, for one will not live in this way to the extent that one is human, but to 
the extent that there is something divine [theion] present in oneself […] One need not 
heed those who insist that, being a human being, one should consider human affairs 
[anthrōpina], or that, being mortal, one should consider mortal things; one should rather 
immortalize [athanatizein] to the extent that this is possible […].33
In The Human Condition, Arendt gives a non-standard and inaccurate translation 
of this passage: “Considering human affairs, one must not … consider man as he 
is and not consider what is mortal in mortal things, but think about them {only} to 
the extent that they have the possibility of immortalizing.” The conclusion that she 
draws from this is accordingly misguided: “The famous passage in Aristotle […] 
occurs very properly in his political writings. For the polis was for the Greeks […] 
the space […] reserved for the relative permanence, if not immortality, of mortals.”34 
However, Aristotle is here not discussing life in the polis, but precisely the solitary life 
32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.8.1178a9–22.
33 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.7.1177a27–b1, b26–28, 31–33. My translation. 
34 Arendt, The Human Condition, 56.
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of contemplation. This also makes problematic Arendt’s distinction between political 
life as a striving for immortality and philosophical life as the search for eternity.35 For 
example, she maintains that since Plato, “concern with the eternal and the life of the 
philosopher are seen as inherently contradictory and in conflict with the striving for 
immortality, the way of life of the citizen […].”36 However, Aristotle is saying, quite on 
the contrary, that as the supreme human (or superhuman) praxis, the contemplation 
of eternal reality will precisely provide the contemplator with a more self-sufficient 
immortality than the life of political action, which is concerned with the contingent. In 
Between Good and Evil, Arendt’s formulation is more adequate: “[…] to ‘immortalize’ 
meant for the philosopher to dwell in the neighborhood of those things which are 
forever […].”37 In The Life of the Mind, she quotes from Plato’s Timaeus a remark 
that is virtually identical to Aristotle’s: “to mind [phronein] immortal and divine things 
[…] to the extent that it is feasible for the constitution [physis] of humans to involve 
[metaschein] immortality [athanasias] […].”38 Here she also quotes the passage 
from Aristotle correctly.39 However, these vacillations are perhaps first and foremost 
a token of Arendt’s rather unscholarly attitude toward ancient texts; her most 
fundamental argument, I think, remains unaffected.
Philosophy does not forfeit the traditional Greek dream of immortality, of the 
human being measuring up to the gods in her own way. It rather proposes to realize 
this dream through the quest for eternity. There is a fundamental difference here 
– a difference that is primarily related to temporality. Like the pre-philosophical 
concept of praxis, even the pre-philosophical conception of immortality is future-
oriented: praxis is understood as the undertaking of new ventures for the future, 
and immortality is understood as the preservation of name and fame throughout 
generations to come. As for Aristotle’s praxis, it is entirely determined by the 
present. The Aristotelian praxis is superior to poiēsis in that it is precisely not future-
oriented, but at every moment already contains its full meaning as present. The 
life of contemplation entails a suppression of the futural dimension that in ordinary 
living gives life its purpose, direction, and meaning. 
Contemplation is supreme because it has no future, and no past, for that 
matter – it is a pure timeless dwelling in the full presence of those eternal truths 
that always already have been and always will be present. The grounds for this 
supremacy of the present in the good life are neither political nor ethical, but rather 
speculative and metaphysical. In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, what is in the full sense 
35 Arendt, The Human Condition, 14–21.
36 Arendt, The Human Condition, 20.
37 Arendt, The Human Condition, 46–47.
38 Plato, Timaeus. In Plato, Platonis opera, Vol. 4: Tetralogiam VIII continens. Ed. John Burnet. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1902, 90c1–3. My translation. Cf. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: Thinking, 129.
39 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: Thinking, 136.
Hannah Arendt: Practice, Thought and Judgement
41
of the word is completely actual, energeia or entelecheia, meaning precisely that 
its future is not open, that it does not have any unrealized potentialities. Aristotle 
does not hesitate to determine the ideal enactment of human life on the basis of 
this ideal being of things. This was pointed out by Martin Heidegger in his reading 
of Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, within the framework of a 1924–25 lecture 
course on Plato’s Sophist – incidentally, the first of Heidegger’s Marburg courses 
attended by the young Arendt:40 
[…] all possibilities of being with regard to the praxis of prephilosophical man are 
dependent, in their very sense, on being with others. Therefore they cannot be man’s 
proper possibilities of being […] our concern is precisely the proper accessibility 
[Vorhandensein] and presence [Anwesenheit] of life. We are asking about the radically 
and ontologically grasped properness [Eigentlichkeit] of being [Seins], which is itself 
the ontological basis for the factual concrete existence of man. […] The philosopher, 
who is concerned purely and exclusively with understanding and disclosing beings, 
can be who he is only if and precisely if he is […] alone with himself. […] Pure seeing 
is a matter of the single individual […]. Herein resides the peculiar tendency of the 
accommodation of human being-there [Dasein], in respect of its being-temporal, to the 
eternity of the world. […] Now it is clear why pure contemplation settles something 
for the existence of man and why it is the highest in the Greek sense. […] For the 
Greeks the contemplation of human existence was oriented purely toward the meaning 
of being itself, i.e., toward the extent to which it is possible for human being-there to be 
everlasting. The Greeks gathered this meaning of being, being as absolute presence, 
from the being of the world.41 
The ethical primacy of solitary contemplation over political participation is 
based, Heidegger maintains, on the metaphysical primacy of permanent presence 
over temporal situatedness. I would like to propose that it is this underlying primacy 
of presence that Arendt refers to in The Human Condition as the “deeper reasons” 
that she decides not to discuss any further:
[…] the very discovery of contemplation (theōria) as a human faculty […] has ruled 
metaphysical and political thought throughout our tradition. It seems unnecessary to my 
present purpose to discuss the reasons for this tradition. Obviously they are deeper than 
the historical occasion which gave rise to the conflict between the polis and the philosopher 
[…]. They must lie in an altogether different aspect of the human condition […].42
The question of the temporal character of human activities – laboring, 
producing, acting, thinking, willing, and judging – and of their different manners of 
facing the future is present throughout Arendt’s work, ever since her dissertation 
40 See Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes [1924–25]. Ed. Ingeborg Schüssler. Gesamtausgabe 19. 
Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1992, 132–179; trans. Plato’s Sophist. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz & 
André Schuwer. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997, 91–123.
41 Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, 176–178; Plato’s Sophist, 121–122. Translation modified.
42 Arendt, The Human Condition, 16.
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on Augustine. I argue that this question of human temporality is the Heideggerian 
heritage at the heart of Arendt’s thinking – and, perhaps, the point in which Arendt 
is ultimately more “Heideggerian” than Heidegger himself in thinking the openness 
and newness of the future in even less traditional terms.43 
We thus see that Arendt’s claim that Aristotle subjugated action to quiet and 
inactive philosophical contemplation is not entirely accurate. Rather, Aristotle 
very subtly realigns the concept of action in such a way that it becomes justified 
to point out contemplation as the supreme, i.e., the most self-sufficient kind of 
action – just as, for Aristotle, rest is the supreme form of movement.44 We see that 
Aristotle’s threefold distinction between production, action, and contemplation is 
ultimately not very rigid: the more fundamental distinction is between 1) future-
oriented, open, and incomplete production and 2) self-immanent auto-production 
in which the end is always already present. To the latter group, strictly speaking, 
only contemplation belongs – all other activities are ultimately means aiming at an 
external end that has not yet been attained. As Villa puts it, “the Aristotelian definition 
of praxis is instrumentalist, insofar as the meaning of action is inseparable from 
a process of teleological actualization”45 and “Aristotle’s understanding of action 
is in fact derived from the fabrication experience.”46 Therefore, politics cannot be 
the scene of the supreme human actions, but only a necessary preparation that 
provides the adequate framework for the practice of contemplative philosophy. Nor 
can political philosophy be more than a handmaiden or “doctor” of the supreme, 
theoretical study of absolute truth:
Yet all the same, it [practical insight, phronēsis] is not the mistress of [theoretical] wisdom 
[sophias], just as medicine is not the mistress of health: for the former does not make 
use of the latter, but attends to its coming to be; the former issues orders for the sake 
of the latter, not to the latter. Further, [were one to maintain the opposite], one might 
43 See e.g. Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin: Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation 
[1929]. Berlin: Philo, 2005; trans. Love and Saint Augustine. Trans. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott & 
Judith Chelius Stark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996; The Human Condition, 12–21, 96–
101, 119–121, 131–139, 167–174, 179–247, 289–294, 313–325; Between Past and Future, 3–90, 
143–71, 227–264; The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: Thinking, 129–151, 197–216; The Life of the Mind, 
Vol. 2: Willing, 11–19, 23–34, 39–51, 104–110. I follow Taminiaux’s (The Thracian Maid and the 
Professional Thinker, 199–217) outstanding discussion of the Heideggerian theme of temporality 
in Arendt. See also Bethânia Assy, “Prolegomenon for an Ethics of Visibility in Hannah Arendt.” 
Kriterion 110 (2004), 294–320; Jeffrey Andrew Barash, “Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt and the 
Politics of Remembrance.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2002), 171–182; Peg 
Birmingham, “Heidegger and Arendt: The Birth of Political Action and Speech.” In François Raffoul & 
David Pettigrew (eds.), Heidegger and Practical Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2002; Andreas Grossmann, “‘Im Anfang liegt alles beschlossen’: Hannah Arendts politisches 
Denken im Schatten eines Heideggerschen Problems.” Man and World 30 (1997), 35–47; Villa, 
Arendt and Heidegger, 113–270. 
44 This is Heidegger’s formulation; see Heidegger, “Vom Wesen und Begriff der physis: Aristoteles, 
Physik B, 1” [1939]. In Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken. 3rd ed. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1996, 
283–284; trans. “On the Essence and Concept of physis in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1” [1939]. Trans. 
Thomas Sheehan. In Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks. Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, 183–230, 216–217.
45 Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil,” 279.
46 Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil,” 47.
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just as well say that political science rules the gods, since it issues orders concerning 
all things in the polis.47
Philosophy’s Forgetfulness of Action 
and the Origins of Totalitarianism 
In Arendtian and Heideggerian terms, a persistent feature of Occidental metaphysics 
is at work within Aristotle’s realignment of the concept of action, namely, the 
subordination of the contingency and factuality of the past and of the uncontrollability 
and unpredictability of the future to the necessity and certainty of the permanent 
present – in other words, the subordination of the temporality of action to the 
temporality of thinking.48 The self-sufficient activity of thinking is the supreme kind 
of action because it is the most secure and most predictable activity. Heidegger 
himself was, according to Arendt, ultimately unable to overcome this presupposition, 
as can be traced from his very traditional philosophical contempt for politics and 
public life.49 Politics is precisely the realm of freedom, contingency, and opinion 
in which human beings are essentially poised against human otherness and the 
unknown future. It is the scene on which humans are able to start something truly 
new, unconstrained by any transcendental or empirical necessity or by predictable 
results, and are also able to share this new project with others.
Aristotle’s articulation of praxis supports Arendt’s claim that philosophy has, 
since ancient times, effectively aspired to dismiss the truly political by thinking 
politics in terms of production, as a means for attaining a higher, supra-political 
end.50 Since the culmination of this tradition in the thought of Marx, political 
philosophy has increasingly been replaced by ideology, i.e., the attempt to 
materialize this philosophical articulation of politics in history – in the famous 
words of Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach, to make philosophy change the world 
47 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.13.1145a6–11. My translation.
48 Cf. in particular Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: Thinking, 202–213.
49 See Arendt, “Martin Heidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt,” 179–192; “For Martin Heidegger’s Eightieth 
Birthday,” 207–217; The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2: Willing, 172–194. Arendt’s early critique of Heidegger 
in the essay “What is Existential Philosophy?” [1946] (Essays in Understanding, 176–82) remains 
quite superficial and largely misguided. However, in the lecture “Concern with Politics in Recent 
European Philosophical Thought” [1954] (In Essays in Understanding, 432–33, 443, 446 n5), Arendt 
considers the possibility that Heidegger’s later thinking could indeed provide the framework for a radical 
philosophical account of human plurality. Cf. Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation 
of Her Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 253–274.
50 Arendt, “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought,” in Essays in 




instead of merely interpreting it.51 For Arendt, the culmination of political ideology 
was the ideological totalitarianism of the 20th century.52 Unlike classical tyranny, 
totalitarianism is no longer content with simply dismissing the plurality of opinions 
and the unpredictability involved in political action, but, in fact, seeks to destroy 
this plurality, spontaneity, and potential newness, to make politics into the smooth, 
secure, and efficient administrative process of implementing a social ideal, such 
as the classless society or the racially purified people’s community, engineered 
by reliable and completely unspontaneous functionaries such as Adolf Eichmann. 
The peculiar new feature of the totalitarian movement is that what is important is 
not the end but the process of producing it – the stringently logical subordination 
of the political realm to the laws of the movement of history as “class struggle” or 
“survival of the fittest.”
The Arendtian critique of Aristotle’s practical philosophy must ultimately be situated 
within this extremely broad historical framework. Taking this framework into account, 
we are perhaps more inclined to assent to her warning in The Human Condition:
The substitution of making for acting and the concomitant degradation of politics into 
a means to obtain an allegedly “higher” end […] is as old as the tradition of political 
philosophy. […] How persistent and successful the transformation of action into a mode 
of making has been is easily attested by the whole terminology of political theory and 
political thought, which indeed makes it almost impossible to discuss these matters 
without using the category of means and ends and thinking in terms of instrumentality. 
[…] We are perhaps the first generation which has become fully aware of the murderous 
consequences inherent in a line of thought that forces one to admit that all means, 
provided that they are efficient, are permissible and justified to pursue something 
defined as an end. […] As long as we believe that we deal with ends and means in the 
political realm, we shall not be able to prevent anybody’s using all means to pursue 
recognized ends.53 
51 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy?” in Essays in Understanding, 171, 175; The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, 143, 249, 463–464, 472; “Religion and Politics” [1953], in Essays in Understanding, 
374–377; The Human Condition, 12, 17; Between Past and Future, 17–40, 77–82; Men in Dark Times 
[1968]. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1995, 92; Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 36; 
The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: Thinking, 176. 
52 Arendt, “Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps” [1950], in Essays 
in Understanding, 232–247; The Origins of Totalitarianism, 460–479; “Understanding and Politics 
(The Difficulties of Understanding),” in Essays in Understanding, 307–327; “On the Nature of 
Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding” [1954], in Essays in Understanding, 328–360; Between 
Past and Future, 87–88.
53 Arendt, The Human Condition, 229.
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